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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
SUSTAINABLE COMPETITION?1 
FERRIES AND COMPETITION ON THE 
CLYDE 
by Professor Neil Kay, Economics Department, 
University of Strathclyde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Gourock-Dunoon (G-D) ferry route is 
presently under review. A consultants report 
(Deloitte & Touche) on mis route was 
commissioned by the last government and is due to 
be released soon for public consultation, though its 
release has been subject to some delay. There are 
two runs on the G-D route, one operated by 
CalMac the state-owned operator and one by 
Western, a private operator. The consultants report 
is expected to detail a number of options for radical 
change, most of which apparently involve the 
closure of one or other of the runs on this route. 
Since this route is only one of many in the Scottish 
system, it is worthwhile asking why it merits such 
attention. There are several reasons. 
Firstly, there are numerous ferry routes in Scottish 
waters with Caledonian-MacBrayne (CalMac) the 
state-owned operator running 28 different services 
and more routes operated by other companies. 
However, the G-D route accounts for about a 
quarter of all passenger journeys and over a third of 
all cars carried in Scottish waters by ferries in the 
!
 I am extremely grateful to Mr Ken Duerden 
(Commercial Director), Andrew Home (Marketing 
Manager) and Mike Blair (Area Manager) of 
Caledonian MacBrayne, and Mr Ken Cadenhead, 
Managing Director of Western Ferries (Clyde) 
Limited, for their time and assistance in dealing 
with some points relevant to mis paper. It should 
be emphasised that the opinions expressed in this 
paper should be regarded as those of the author 
alone, and should not be seen as necessarily 
indicative of the views of any other party. 
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course of a year2. A map helps indicate why this 
route is so busy. The Gourock-Dunoon ferries link 
the north and south sides of the Clyde in its lower 
reaches in much the same way that the Forth 
Bridges link the north and south sides of the lower 
reaches of the Forth. 
Secondly, the G-D route cannot be looked at in 
isolation. What happens here fundamentally affects 
CalMac's Wemyss Bay/Rothesay service since the 
two routes are tightly linked operationally, sharing 
boats on a daily basis. Any radical changes for 
CalMac's service on the G-D run would have 
spillover implications for its sister run. If we add 
the volume of traffic for die Rothesay route to that 
for the G-D route, then we are covering over 30% 
of passengers and over 40% of all cars carried by 
ferries in domestic Scottish waters in the course of 
a year. 
Thirdly, and unusually, the G-D route is 
characterised by competition. It is virtually unique 
in Scottish waters in having two operators 
competing head to head for overlapping markets. 
The question has been raised whether or not 
competition (at least in its present form) is 
sustainable on this route. If it is not possible on 
such a busy route, it is difficult to find any other 
route in Scottish waters where sustainable 
competition would be possible. If competition is 
sustainable, then it offers the prospect of offering 
benchmarks and measures of best practice that 
might be helpful in setting reference standards in 
routes where there is no room for more than one 
operator. 
Consequently, the decision on the G-D route is 
important for economic and strategic reasons, and 
for reasons of public policy. In this paper we shall 
analyse the present structure of me route and the 
nature of competition on it, as well as the source of 
current problems. We shall recommend a possible 
course of action that may be, at best, a workable 
solution to the problems on this route, or, at worst, 
a simple option mat provides a baseline against 
which to compare other possible solutions. 
2. THE PRESENT ROUTE 
STRUCTURE 
The G-D ferry route comprises one service 
Figures derived from Scottish Transport Statistics, 
and a letter to the Herald (October 8th 1998) by Mr 
Ken Cadenhead, Managing Director of Western 
Ferries, detailing Western's market share on this 
route. 
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provided by CalMac (the publicly-owned operator) 
and one by Western Ferries (a privately owned 
operator). For the purposes of this paper we shall 
describe these individual services on the G-D route 
as "runs". The two runs criss-cross each other 
across the Clyde. CalMac's run terminates near to 
the respective town centres on either side and is 
about 70% longer in distance than Western's. 
Western's terminals are a few minutes drive from 
the CalMac terminals. The CalMac run connects 
with other forms of public transport such as trains 
(Gourock) and buses and so is generally much 
more attractive for foot passengers. Access to 
other forms of public transport is more limited for 
Western. The Western boats are slower than 
CalMacs and in fact usually take about the same 
journey time (twenty minutes). Given the 
closeness of the respective access points and the 
similar journey times, the physical location of 
actual run does not make much difference to most 
drivers, though it would be significant for foot 
passengers. 
CalMac's boats have a carrying capacity for about 
40 cars, Western's is more variable though its larger 
vessels have car capacity close to that of CalMac's 
vessels. CalMac's boats have capacity for more 
than 500 passengers, Western typically have 
capacity for more than 200 passengers. However, 
it should be noted that passenger capacity is based 
on the assumption that many car passengers will 
stay in their cars during the voyage. CalMac's boats 
are also designed for foot passengers and have 
comfortable accommodation on two passenger 
decks. Western's passenger provision consists of 
wooden slatted benches in a windowless cabin 
below the car deck on its older ships, and even the 
improved accommodation on one of its latest 
acquisitions only has seating for 24 passengers. By 
way of contrast, the demand for passenger seating 
on a busy CalMac sailing can exceed this number 
many times over. The CalMac boats also have 
catering facilities while the Western boats do not. 
Schedules vary marginally by season, but CalMac 
typically operates an hourly service off-peak on the 
G-D run, with Western operating a half-hourly 
service. Under restrictions agreed with die Scottish 
Office, CalMac is only allowed to advertise one 
sailing per hour except at peak period (when 
CalMac operates a half-hourly service). Western 
offers up to a 3-4 boat service hourly, depending on 
demand. Western runs into the late evening, 
CalMac stops earlier in the evening. Because 
CalMacs boats on the G-D and Rothesay runs are 
shared, this imposes limits on timetabling. For 
example, in the winter Rothesay has a one-boat 
service at peak period and a two-boat service off-
peak, essentially because CalMac only releases its 
second boat on the G-D run off-peak. 
3. PERCEIVED NEED FOR CHANGE 
ON THE ROUTE 
The last government commissioned the present 
consultant's report because there was a perceived 
need for change on this route. CalMac's boats were 
regarded as obsolete and nearing the end of their 
working life, though they are in fact younger than 
Western's boats. Any replacement of these boats 
for the publicly owned operator could entail 
substantial public funds. In addition, maintenance 
or improvement of the pier at Dunoon used by 
CalMac could also require substantial public funds 
contingent on any decision made about the future 
operation of the route. 
A further element that enters into consideration is 
that CalMac was apparently making an operating 
loss of about £800,000 a year on this run, while 
Western was reportedly making a profit of about an 
equivalent amount. Further, CalMac appeared to 
be steadily losing market share over the Nineties on 
this route to its private competitor (we look at this 
further below). However, it has been difficult to 
get precise figures on Western's traffic levels and 
profitability levels because it is a private operator3. 
On the face of it, there would appear to be a prima 
facie case for CalMac withdrawing from the route 
given the apparent obsolescence of its vessels and 
the apparently superior performance of the private 
operator. However, it is not quite as simple as that 
and we shall deal with the question of obsolescence 
and performance in turn. 
Firstly, as far as obsolescence is concerned, 
CalMac's regular boats on the G-D run are actually 
newer than Western's, but they will require re-
engined at some point in the future if they are to 
continue in operation. This is a technical operation 
with modest financial implications that would 
enable the working life of the boats to be extended 
for several years. As far as current performance is 
concerned, the boats are fast, comfortable and have 
provision for ancillary facilities such as catering. 
They provide a good standard of service that could 
not be replicated by Western's type of boats. 
3
 CalMacs traffic levels are available as a matter of 
public record on a route by route basis (Scottish 
Transport Statistics'), and figures on its profitability 
of its operations are published on an area basis in 
its annual report 
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Secondly, Western's performance compared to 
CalMacs should not be regarded as simply a reward 
for greater efficiency. To a large extent it reflects 
gains from selective privatisation. The prospect of 
wholesale privatisation of CalMac's public services 
had in fact been raised and then decided against as 
impractical in the early days of the last 
government. However, it did not reject the notion 
of privatisation of ferry services where possible. 
At the same time, it did not put into place any 
regulatory machinery to oversee such privatisation, 
unlike the case for many other industries, such as 
railways. This encouraged what became a mix of 
public and private ownership in the case of the G-D 
route4. 
The problems with partially or selectively 
privatising an industry is that private firms will 
prefer to select the potentially profitable parts of 
the network and leave the state to pick up the loss 
makers. For example, it is not difficult to find 
firms willing to take on high volume, low cost local 
intra-city postal services given the opportunity. It 
is usually more difficult to find takers for low 
volume, high cost rural services. In the case of the 
Gourock-Dunoon ferries, Western targeted a 
potentially high volume route, and the high value 
low cost car segment within that route. In addition, 
Western was able to exercise choice over the type 
of boats it could employ and the frequency of 
operation. 
By way of contrast, CalMac was constrained to a 
provide a public service to much of the Highlands 
and Islands area and provide a higher cost level of 
facilities on the Dunoon run, especially for foot 
passengers. In order to cover the longer run in the 
time available it also needed faster (and more 
expensive) boats than Western. As noted above, it 
was also limited by the government in the 
frequency of operation it could advertise, a 
supposed quid pro for receiving subsidy (which 
Western did not). The restriction also dates from 
the early Eighties when it was seen as a capacity-
balancing measure to prevent CalMac using its 
(then) greater potential capacity on the route to 
push Western out of the market. Clearly this is a 
restriction that is now well out of date, and indeed 
in recent years it has been serving to distort rather 
than balance capacity on this route, to the benefit of 
the private operator. 
4
 Although Western had been involved in the route 
since the Seventies, the major policy decisions 
which were to influence the development of the 
route were taken in the early Eighties. 
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However, it should be noted that mis reflects the 
current outcome rather than the state of affairs that 
existed when the current rules of the game were set 
out in the early-Eighties. In those early days, 
Western was a small operator barely on the fringes 
of viability with fewer, smaller capacity boats and a 
much smaller market than today. The decision to 
enter this market was a high risk decision and the 
fact that it has turned out to be profitable should be 
regarded as at least partly reflecting rewards for 
entrepreneurial endeavour. Western has 
subsequently made a great success of a clearly 
focused cost-oriented strategy. Once it was decided 
to encourage competition on this market, the 
restrictions were probably necessary to allow the 
fledging company room to grow. The question is 
whether they are still necessary now that Western 
is the dominant player on this route. Also, the 
question of what is an acceptable balance between 
returns to entrepreneurial endeavour and 
unacceptable returns due to market dominance is 
one that recurs in many industrial contexts, not just 
ferry operations. 
A further point that critically influences operator 
performance on this route is the length of the 
respective runs. An obvious comparator in terms of 
performance would be some measure of operating 
cost per user journey (with some form of weighting 
to reflect the different categories of user). 
However, this would be unfair and inaccurate since 
the CalMac run is about 70% longer than the 
Western run. Instead, a fairer measure of 
performance would be a measure of operating cost 
per user-rrrile5, which would certainly narrow any 
implied difference in performance on the part of 
the two operators. 
Another way of looking at this issue is to ask how 
the Western boats would perform if they were 
required to use the CalMac run (allowing for any 
necessary changes to pier facilities). If they were to 
travel at the same speed as on their present run they 
would take about 34 minutes to cross the Clyde (as 
opposed to their present 20 minutes). This would 
lead to unavoidable increases of up to 70% per 
journey in many operating costs related to travel 
time (such as fuel and labour costs). Once these are 
factored into the equation, the longer length of this 
run means it is unlikely that an operator would be 
able to transport Western's current customer base 
5
 Cost per user-mile is regarded as a useful 
performance indicator in other contexts, e.g. in 
measuring subsidy cost per user-mile in the rail 
system. 
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at current tariff levels using Western-style boats 
and still make an operating profit on this run. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether any car-service 
operator could make an operating profit on this run 
at current tariff levels 
In short, the differences in profitability are not 
surprising and are likely to be influenced by (a) 
Western's greater frequency of service (b) higher 
quality service and cost of CalMac's boats (c) 
Western's shorter run impacting favourably on its 
operating cost per user journey. These reflect the 
combination of Western's advantages in being able 
to pick and focus on the route and market segment 
it wished to target, and CalMacs disadvantages in 
terms of restrictions that influenced its frequency of 
service and cost of service (including operating 
costs per user-mile). It would be inaccurate to 
regard the differences in profitability as simply 
reflecting greater efficiency on the part of the 
private operator. 
None of this implies a criticism of Western since it 
was simply doing what a responsible commercial 
operator should do, which is to extract maximum 
returns for its shareholders. If there is a fault here, 
it lies with those who designed the rules for 
competition in this market in the first place. 
However, the opportunities facing Western and the 
continuing restrictions facing CalMac gave 
Western a significant competitive advantage over 
CalMac. Consequently, it is unfair to compare 
CalMac's performance on the G-D run with that of 
its private competitor. Better comparisons would be 
with its performance on other runs or with other 
transport operators providing a public service, 
especially ferry companies. 
In this context CalMac's £800,000 operating loss 
on the G-D run (and implied need for subsidy) does 
not appear really exceptional. CalMac actually 
made an operating loss of £5.6 million on its 
operations overall in 1997 and its G-D run 
accounted for about 12% of its passenger and car 
traffic by volume6. CalMac's operating loss is 
almost certainly higher on the G-D run than it 
would have been in the absence of competition, but 
the extent to which it is greater should not be 
exaggerated. Care should also be taken to avoid 
concluding that all of the operating loss would be 
avoided if the run was closed down; for example, if 
the publicised operating loss contains provision for 
overheads, it may be reasonable to expect that 
many of these overhead costs would continue to be 
6
 Source: CalMac Annual Report and Accounts for 
1997-98. Revenue figures not available 
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incurred even after closure of the run. 
Network operators in transport industries typically 
make operating losses. In the case of CalMac, its 
need for subsidy as a percentage of turnover stood 
at 25% (1996-7) and 23% (1997-8)7, despite the 
loss of the highly profitable Kyle-Kyleakin route 
on the opening of the Skye Bridge in 1995. This is 
not out of line with the performance of many other 
transport operators such as Scotrail (£230 million 
subsidy at 22p a passenger mile in 1997/98)8, and 
CalMac's counterpart on the west coast of Canada, 
BC (British Columbia) Ferries: in 1995-96 BC 
Ferries received a $31 million subsidy on top of 
$341 revenues from users and still recorded a loss 
of $39.5 million9. 
If all transport routes that did not make a profit 
were to be closed, it would not leave many in 
operation. CalMac's G-D run does make a loss but 
the loss is not much more than would be expected 
from a public service of this kind. The loss is also 
made in the face of competition against a private 
firm that has been certain competitive advantages 
over CalMac. The important questions are: what 
are the alternatives; and, in particular is 
competition sustainable (and desirable) on this 
route? We shall deal briefly with the first of these 
questions in the next section. 
4. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
There is not really space to deal with all of the 
various technical and organisational alternatives to 
the present arrangement on this route, but we shall 
briefly outline some relevant considerations. Many 
of the proposals that have been made involve either 
a single operator on the route, or a single run on the 
route (at least for car users). Each of these 
solutions involves major problems. We raise some 
of these issues here; it should be bome in mind that 
they should be compared against keeping the 
present structure (and boats) with the associated 
potential benefits of competition. Costs of this 
latter option would include remedial work on the 
boats and the pier at Dunoon. 
Any operator adopting Western-style boats on the 
CalMac run would find they are slower and almost 
7
 Ibid 
8
 Source: Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (see 
www.opraf.gov.uk) 
9
 Source: BC Ferries annual reports and Economic 
Impact of Major Marine Initiatives - Final Report 
March 1997. Prepared for Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Canada 
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certainly not suitable. As discussed above, they 
would take much longer to make the journey than 
on the current Western run and (unless subsidised), 
tariffs would probably have to reflect the higher 
operating cost per user-mile. This would 
considerably reduce the value of the service to 
users and make it uncompetitive with me existing 
Western run. 
The lack of appropriate sheltered and seating 
capacity for passengers on Western's run is 
currently disguised by the fact that it is targeted at 
car users and carry relatively few foot passengers. 
If similar boats were to be used on CalMac's 
current run, it is unlikely that they would be able to 
provide suitable provision for foot passengers at 
busy periods. 
If either run were to be closed down, it would 
exacerbate what can already be severe capacity and 
congestion problems at the appropriate terminals. 
Even running up to 4 ferries hour, Western is 
already experiencing capacity problems at times of 
heavy demand, with CalMac effectively acting to 
mop up overspill. There are also physical 
constraints on car parking and queuing to be taken 
into account. If we extrapolate even a modest 
expected growth rate in car usage of, say 1-2% a 
year over the next few years, then with compound 
growth we would expect any capacity and 
congestion problems to worsen rather than 
improve, especially if one of the runs was closed. 
Indeed it would be strange to consider closing 
down one of the two ferry runs for such a busy 
route across the Clyde at the same time that serious 
consideration is apparently being given to a new 
bridge over the Forth. 
Other solutions include the purchase of new boats. 
If this is to be done by the public operator it may 
involve significant amounts of public money. If 
this is to be considered, then it is important to show 
that the present situation is unsustainable. 
We shall consider this last issue in Section 6. First, 
however, we shall consider the nature of 
competition on this route. 
5. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF 
COMPETITION ON THE G-D ROUTE 
Ferries can compete with other forms of transport 
(such as air travel) on price, frequency, vessel 
capacity, comfort, crossing times, reliability, and 
on-board facilities10. All of these are of potential 
Cambridge Policy Consultants (1998) An 
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relevance on the G-D route, and to these elements 
we can add route characteristics, timetabling and 
access considerations for this route. The different 
considerations can influence how the ferries 
compete with each other as well as with 
alternatives. 
Price: The two operators match each other closely 
on price and CalMac has even been cheaper in the 
case of some posted prices. The pricing and selling 
practices in retail outlets on the Cowal Peninsula 
are more tightly co-ordinated by CalMac than they 
are by Western. 
Frequency: Western score heavily on frequency 
with two off-peak ferries per hour compared to 
CalMacs one. At peak period CalMac have two 
ferries an hour, Western have three to four per hour 
Vessel capacity: Capacity is not normally a 
problem for CalMac. Western do encounter 
capacity problems for cars at times. Passenger 
capacity is not normally a problem. However, it 
should be noted that while Western's passenger 
capacity is officially over 200 for most of its 
ferries, this assumes that most passengers stay in 
cars for the duration of the voyage. There is 
minimal seating for foot passengers, as few as 24 
places in the case of a recent acquisition. 
Comfort: Western's passenger seating is limited 
and basic. CalMac's facilities are comfortable and 
spacious on two separate passenger decks 
Crossing times: The crossing times are similar for 
both operators at about twenty minutes. The faster 
speed of the CalMac boats compensates for the fact 
that its route is 70% longer. 
Reliability: As far as is known, there are no 
publicly available figures for reliability of services 
on this route. However, CalMac has impressive 
fleet-wide reliability figures with over 97% pa-
cent of scheduled services completed on time and a 
little over 1% of scheduled services cancelled in 
1997/98. On the Dunoon route, Western has a 
marginally more reliable service in certain weather 
considerations because of technical problems with 
harbour facilities in rough weather. Reliability is 
not perceived to be a major issue for either of these 
operators, despite the fact that a force 8 gale poses 
more logistical problems than the wrong kind of 
snow or leaves on the track. 
Evaluation of Ferrv Subsidies on the Northern and 
Western Islands of Scotland. Report to Scottish 
Office, p.v 
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On-board services: CalMac has on-board catering, 
Western has none. This is discussed further below. 
Timetabling: Western starts their service earlier 
and runs much later than CalMac, hours of work 
complications impacting more on the latters 
timetabling. This can make Western more 
attractive for certain users. 
Route and run characteristics: Ferry is not the only 
method of access to the Cowal Peninsula, there is 
also road access via Rest-and-Be-Thankful. This 
involves an 80 mile journey Dunoon-Glasgow; 
ferry is generally more convenient for many 
travellers The relative attractiveness of the road 
option depends on potential users intended route, 
especially start and finish points. As discussed 
above, the CalMac run integrates well with other 
forms of public transport while Western's is less 
convenient. There is less difference in the physical 
location of the respective runs as far as most car 
travellers are concerned given the relative 
closeness of the respective access points. 
Access considerations: by access considerations, 
we do not mean physical access but how easy it is 
for travellers to actually use the service. We shall 
discuss this further below with reference to the 
special case of ticketing procedures and suggest 
that this may be an important consideration in this 
case. 
If we were to summarise the major competitive 
elements in this case, it would seem that price 
competition is not really an issue on this route. 
Instead, Western score strongly in terms of 
frequency, while CalMac should have an advantage 
in terms of services, such as comfort and catering 
facilities. In fact, we shall argue mat it is not 
necessarily so clear cut as this and that Western 
also score better than CalMac in the case of some 
services if we include access considerations. 
Further, it will be argued that CalMac has not 
really fully exploited potential sources of 
competitive advantage on this route, and we shall 
consider the reasons why. 
6. ACTUAL COMPETITION ON THE 
G-D ROUTE 
Many transport routes where operators compete 
head to head may be characterised in terms of 
knife-edge competition, that is it may be difficult to 
sustain more than one operator in the long run. If 
one operator drops its price or increases its 
frequency of operations, this may lead to increased 
customers, increased revenues and increased 
profits. This may enable or encourage the operator 
to repeat its action, closing the loop and creating a 
virtuous circle. If the second operator does nothing 
in these circumstances, it will be eventually driven 
out of the market. If it responds by matching its 
rival's actions, then we may be faced with a 
destructive price war or a process of frequency-
matching that simply cannot be sustained in the 
long run. At some point one firm will be driven 
out of the market and the other will monopolise the 
market. 
Economists have been aware of these issues for 
some time and the traditional response was to 
recommend public ownership, or, more recently, 
direct regulation. However, in the Eighties it was 
suggested that the theory of contestable markets" 
could provide a solution. The basic argument here 
was that even in the case of natural monopoly (i.e. 
room for only one firm because of economies of 
scale), the winning firm might not be able to enjoy 
the fruits of their victory if markets were 
characterised by an absence of entrance and exit 
barriers. 
It was argued that some markets such as transport 
could be regarded as potentially contestable since it 
is usually easy to physically redeploy transport 
equipment such as buses and aircraft between 
markets. Contestable theory argues that any single 
operator on a single route trying to exploit its 
dominance through monopoly pricing would 
quickly find a competitor entering, under-pricing 
and pushing out the incumbent, and prices 
eventually being pushed down to the level where 
monopoly profits are eliminated. 
However, in practice it is difficult to find markets 
that approximate the contestable ideal, even in 
transport. For example, if the bus industry was 
contestable, it is difficult to explain why the owners 
of the Stagecoach company now rank amongst the 
richest individuals in Scotland. The ferry industry 
is even less likely to exhibit contestability since it 
will require access to physical infrastructure (such 
as piers) and there may be network level economies 
(such as in fleet management). 
So since Western was able to vary its frequency of 
operation but CalMac was not (except on the 
margins), there was every reason to expect that 
Western would be able to exploit a virtuous circle 
11
 See Baumol, W. J, Panzer, J, and R. Willig 
(1982) Contestable Markets. New York, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich. 
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from increasing its frequency of operation and 
eventually push CaJMac out of this market The 
surprise is not that this is happening, rather the 
surprise is that it has not happened more quickly 
than it has. There are two points worth noting in 
this context; firstly is Western acting 
anticompetitively? Secondly, is there anything 
other than restrictions on frequency that is limiting 
CalMacs response? 
As far as the first question is concerned, there is no 
evidence that Western is acting anticompetitively. 
It is certainly not indulging in predatory pricing, 
since it is able to price low but still make a profit 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that it is the public 
operator that is pricing below cost in this context 
There is no evidence that Western is using its 
greater flexibility in scheduling to push CalMac out 
of the market (as has happened in the bus market in 
some cases). Its use of frequency variation as a 
competitive tool is legitimate in terms of the rules 
laid down in this contest. 
As far as whether and how CalMac could have 
responded to the competitive threat from Western, 
we shall deal with this question in the next section. 
7. SERVICES AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR DIFFERENTIATED COMPETITION 
There is one obvious source of competitive 
advantage open to CalMac versus Western on this 
route - differentiated competition built around 
services that it can offer. As noted above its boats 
are faster, more spacious and more comfortable 
compared to those of Western and also offer 
catering services. Yet these advantages have not 
been sufficient to stem its erosion of market share. 
One obvious reason is that the major market for 
which these characteristics may prove attractive 
(foot passengers) represents a captive market 
anyway because of CalMac's links to the respective 
town centres and connections to onward public 
transport. They may appreciate services such as 
catering, but the decision to travel by CalMac is 
unlikely to be affected by the quality of these 
services. 
Instead it is the more flexible (and lucrative) car 
market that represents the market for which there 
has been real competition between the two 
operators. It can also be argued that CalMac has 
not competed properly to keep or win market share 
on this market. The problems can be summarised 
in two main issues (1) the existence of access 
barriers and (2) failure to take advantage of 
potential differentiation advantages in commodity 
bundling. We shall look at both in turn. 
Access barriers - the case of ticketing: As a recent 
Scottish Office report noted in connection with 
ferry services, "Households, businesses and tourists 
make decisions in the light of real or perceived 
changes in accessibility"12. This usually is taken to 
refer to broad-based characteristics associated with 
the route. However, if there is competition within a 
route, just marginal real or perceived differences in 
ease of access and usage of specific runs can create 
significant differences in the relative attractiveness 
of respective operators. 
This can be seen in the example of ticketing 
practices on the G-D route. As is common with 
other ferry operations at home and abroad, both 
operators offer discounted books for frequent 
travellers, in this case in books often, and for those 
in the Dunoon area these are widely available for 
sale at retail outlets in the area. There is no time 
limit on use of the discounted books sold by 
Western, nor does the user's car registration have to 
be specified on the discounted ticket. Individual 
tickets can also be bought on board ship and tickets 
can be surrendered without the driver having to 
leave his or her car; a ticket collector comes round 
to the cars. Business travellers may be able to use 
the remaining ticket stub as a claim for travel 
expenses. 
By way of contrast, the CalMac car user has to go 
to the Pursers Office on board ship to buy a single 
ticket or exchange the voucher for discounted 
tickets. This can be inconvenient and may involve 
a lengthy queue at busy times. The car user has to 
have his or her car registration printed on the 
discounted tickets, and faces a time limit of six 
months over which he or she has to use all the 
tickets. When the car ticket is surrendered at the 
end of the voyage, there is no evidence he or she 
travelled by CalMac unless separate arrangements 
have been made to get a receipt, which can be a 
cumbersome procedure. 
This may lead to at least four different barriers or 
disincentive to access for CalMac travellers. 
Firstly, having to queue at the Pursers Office may 
discourage elderly or disabled drivers or drivers 
with young children - or simply drivers who do not 
like the inconvenience. Secondly, restricting the 
discount ticket by specifying the car may 
discourage two-car families who will have to hold 
separate books of car discount tickets for CalMac 
when they only have to buy one for Western. 
12
 CPC study, op cit, page 8. 
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Social Trends (1997)13 noted that 24% of 
households in GB now have at least two cars, so it 
is likely mat CalMac's car-specific discounting 
system will affect a number of potential users. 
Thirdly, the time limit may influence all but those 
who are absolutely certain they will use all the 
CalMac tickets in the time period; occasional 
drivers who use both Western and CalMac would 
therefore be inclined to stick to Western. Fourthly, 
a driver who can more easily use his Western 
discount tickets for business expense claims will be 
encouraged to use that service. 
There are some other points worth noting about 
these four types of access barrier; 
There is no obvious or necessary overlap between 
these four different groups of car users potentially 
switching to Western because of CalMac's ticketing 
practices. Clearly it may be difficult to say how 
important each of these groups are, but there is 
casual evidence that they exist 
These may be issues that influence the decision as 
to which operator to choose, but they are unlikely 
to be major considerations in the decision as to 
whether or not to travel by ferry. Consequently, 
they are unlikely to appear as serious issues 
encountered by CalMac in other routes in where it 
is the single operator 
In the context of the G-D route, even if each of 
these four types of access barriers attributable to 
CalMac's ticketing practices accounts for a small 
proportion of Westerns travellers, they can 
collectively represent a major loss of custom to 
CalMac. Suppose each of the four different groups 
of car users discouraged by CalMac's ticketing 
practices represented just 1% each of Western car 
custom on the G-D run. Collectively this would 
represent 4% of Western's car-based traffic. 
However, given Western's larger market share, this 
represents about 16% of CalMac's car-based traffic. 
This would represent a significant proportion of 
CalMac's business lost to Western simply because 
of ticketing practices. 
Commodity bundling - the case of catering: 
Commodity bundling is a competitive strategy in 
which the components of the bundled set would 
normally be priced higher individually man when 
the bundle is presented or sold as a package. Thus 
supermarkets may provide cheap or free parking 
and cross-subsidised creche facilities to attract 
13
 Office of National Statistics (1997) Social 
Trends. London. 
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custom, airlines may compete in providing high 
quality and/or free services such as in-flight meals 
and entertainment. 
CalMac's service facilities would appear to be an 
obvious area in which it could compete against 
Western by offering good quality, reasonably 
priced, and varied retail services 
(catering/newspapers etc). This should be an 
extremely attractive option since Western is in no 
position to retaliate in this area. 
Suppose for example, that the elasticity of demand 
for CalMacs catering services is about -0.5, so that 
for every 10% fall in price, volume of sales 
increases by 5%. Suppose CalMacs on-board 
catering has revenues of about £1000 a week. If it 
reduced its prices by 10% it would lose £50 
catering revenue a week. But if this attracted just 
two extra daily car journeys that would otherwise 
have gone by Western (out of daily Western 
carryings of over 1000 cars), the indirect gains in 
extra car and passenger tariffs would more than pay 
for die direct loss of revenue attributable to the 
catering price decrease. This is only an indicative 
example, clearly quality improvements could also 
help attract car-based custom, especially for those 
car drivers for whom the ferry journey is only a 
part of a significantly longer trip. If removing 
access barriers could be expected to provide a 
reasonable level of benefits in terms of CalMac's 
market share, then the same might be expected for 
enhanced services such as catering. 
However, CalMac has recently franchised out its 
catering services on board its G-D service and 
effectively lost control of this arm of its marketing 
strategy. In terms of price and variety of service, 
the catering on the G-D run now compares badly 
with services on some other parts of the network. 
In a sense, this is the wrong way round. Like 
ticketing practices, catering is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on the decision to travel on a 
particular route since it is only part of a number of 
variables influencing this decision. However, as the 
airlines believe, it may have an impact on the 
decision as to which operator to choose on a 
particular route. It makes more sense to have the 
highest standards of catering on the routes for 
which you are facing real competition, not to 
reduce the standards of these services on such 
routes as CalMac has done. 
So does die existence of access barriers (such as 
ticketing practices) and the failure to properly 
differentiate its product (for example through 
catering services) represent a failure on the part of 
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CalMac's management? Interestingly, I believe the 
answer is no, it can be argued that this actually 
signals rational and sensible decisions on the part 
of the company. The company is highly 
professional and well organised at marketing the 
company and its overall services to the public1*, but 
there have been special considerations at work in 
the case of the G-D run. 
It is important to see access barriers and catering 
services in the context of the development of the 
route. In the first phase, up to 1990, CalMac 
experienced significant growth on the G-D run as 
on most of its other routes (126,000 cars in 1987 up 
to 147,000 cars in 1990). The phrase, if it is not 
broken, don't try to fix it, would seem appropriate 
to this period. In the next phase (1990-92) CalMac 
car traffic slumped to 123,00 in just two years due 
to a combination of the closure of the US naval 
base in the Holy Loch, economic pressures, and 
increasing competition from Western. It is unlikely 
that marginal improvements to the service would 
have seemed an appropriate or sufficient response 
to such a major slump in demand. 
The third and final phase, 1992 to the present day, 
is one that has been categorised by continuing 
steady erosion of CalMacs market base (2-3% of its 
car market a year) and heightened uncertainty 
regarding the future of this route and CalMac's 
continued participation in it (finally reflected in the 
consultants report commissioned to look at the 
route). This has encouraged a short-term 
perspective to both ticketing practices and catering. 
As far as ticketing practices are concerned, there 
are operational economies to be had from 
standardising procedures throughout the route. The 
various access barriers represented by ticketing 
enables tight control and close monitoring by 
CalMac. They may inconvenience some 
passengers, but it is unlikely that they will seriously 
affect the decision to travel on routes where 
CalMac is the single operator - which is the 
standard situation on its other runs. 
The implication of our previous discussion is that 
there is a need for CalMac to differentiate its 
ticketing practices on this route in order to 
eliminate all or some of the access barriers. This is 
unlikely to involve major capital expenditures but 
new procedures would involve some start-up costs 
in equipment and retraining. It would also involve 
the loss of the benefits of standardisation in 
14
 See, for example, the organisation and 
presentation of its award winning web site. 
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practices across all its routes. It may not be 
worthwhile considering such decisions as long as 
there is continuing short-term uncertainty 
concerning the future of CalMac's involvement in 
this route. As far as catering is concerned, similar 
considerations apply. It may not be worthwhile 
investing in building up a reputation for good value 
catering on this route if the there is a real 
possibility that the route may be removed from 
CalMac in the near future. 
In short, if it could be made worthwhile for CalMac 
to eliminate the negatives (access barriers) and 
accentuate the positives (differentiated 
competition) then this holds out the prospect of 
recovery of some market share for CalMac, and 
stable and sustainable competition in this market. 
This would be unlikely to eliminate the need for 
subsidy on this run. As noted earlier, subsidy 
would probably be needed whatever operator was 
running a car service on this run. However, it 
would represent improved value for money over 
the status quo and could represent a reasonable 
(and probably unavoidable) price for a maintaining 
a two run service competing on the Gourock-
Dunoon route. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It was noted at the start that sustainable 
competition might be regarded as the preferred 
solution for many markets if it can achieved. In 
practice, the problem is to be found in the word 
"sustainable" and on the face of it, the G-D ferry 
route does appear to be characterised by features, 
which make competition intrinsically unstable in 
this context. 
However, it has been argued here that there may be 
scope for what might be described as differentiated 
competition on this route, with Western competing 
on the basis of frequency of operation and CalMac 
compering on the basis of services. Consideration 
should also be given to dropping the obsolete 
restriction on CalMac's frequency of operation. 
This would at least open up the possibility of 
correcting some of the distortion in frequency of 
operation caused by this restriction. We have not 
discussed the problem of remedial work on the 
Dunoon pier if the current levels and forms of 
service is to be maintained, but this is likely to be a 
problem which will have to be given urgent 
attention whatever solution is adopted. 
The solution that we are suggesting here is that the 
respective operators should be encouraged to 
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continue to operate with the present route structure 
for a reasonable period of time, say five years. The 
operators would also be encouraged to compete 
with the same types of boats as currently employed 
on the route. It should be emphasised that this 
should not be regarded as a status quo or do 
nothing alternative. Rather this would remove the 
immediate threat to CalMac's run and so give it a 
reasonable period to consider investing in methods 
and practices which would both remove access 
barriers (e.g. by matching Western's ticketing 
practices) and allow them to differentiate then-
service from mat of Western. The progress and 
nature of differentiated competition on the route 
could be monitored by the Scottish Office over this 
period to see if lessons could be drawn from the 
experience. There are a number of other advantages 
to this solution; 
It is low risk. It involves very litde investment by 
either company and, at least for the moment, avoids 
the need for potentially controversial financing 
proposals such as PFI or PPP. Even if it fails, little 
harm will have been done and something will have 
been learned. 
It does not pre-empt any other solution, including 
those detailed in the options set out in the 
consultants report. These could remain on the table, 
where and if this is thought appropriate. However, 
it does give a breathing space and planning period 
to see if sustainable competition is possible on this 
route. 
If it works, it could avoid the need for a regulatory 
framework in this route, though it would be 
desirable for it to be lightly monitored by the 
Scottish Office to make sure neither operator resort 
to unfair competitive behaviour. 
It gives a unique opportunity to see if sustainable 
competition is workable in cases such as ferry 
services. 
The solution is in tune wim the current emphasis on 
Best Value in the Scottish Office. The terms of 
reference for the consultants report were written 
under the previous government in which the 
emphasis was more on least cost solutions. To a 
large extent, that report has been overtaken by 
events. 
To the extent that CalMac improves its services to 
users by testing them in the market place in 
competition with Western, it may provide internal 
benchmarks and measures of Best Value that could 
be considered for adoption fleet-wide where 
appropriate. 
It is in the interests of CalMac that it succeeds in 
maintaining a viable role in the face of private 
competition. "Viability" here should be judged in 
terms of how it performs once its disadvantages 
versus the private operator in terms of frequency of 
service, quality of service, and costs associated 
with the longer run are taken into account. If it is 
deemed to not perform adequately, it may lead to 
arguments for further privatisation elsewhere in its 
system. Subsidy in this context should be seen as a 
price that is contingent on historic and present 
disadvantages imposed on the public operator 
compared to the private operator. 
Interestingly, it may also be in the long-term 
interests of Western that CalMac survives on this 
route. If CalMac withdrew, then Western would 
have effective sole control of one of the most 
important strategic arteries on the West Coast. 
There would then be strong pressure for action to 
be taken to protect the public interest (e.g. 
regulatory control over the route). There is no 
guarantee that Western would be better off as a 
consequence of such changes. 
Finally, the test with which the present set of 
recommendations should be judged is quite simple; 
is there a better alternative or set of alternatives? At 
the very least this present exercise may help set a 
reasonable baseline against which other proposals 
can be judged. 
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